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howcooperationarisesfromrationalplayers
Mu Yifen; Guo Lei
2013
Source Publicationsciencechinainformationscience
ISSN1674-733X
Volume56Issue:11
AbstractIn classical control systems, the plant to be controlled does not have intention to gain its payoff or benefit, which is obviously not the case in various aspects of social and economic systems(or subsystems). In the latter case, competition and cooperation between players who will optimize their own payoffs turn out to be an important feature, and a fundamental problem is how to achieve cooperation from these rational players. In this paper, we present a neat way to lead to cooperation in dynamical Prisoner's Dilemma game. In our scenario, the two players are heterogenous with hierarchical roles as the 'leader' and the 'follower' respectively. It is shown that the system will co-evolve into and stay at the cooperation state if and only if the leader is restricted not to take the dominating strategies. For the special case of 1-step-memory, the optimal strategies for the leader and follower are 'Tit for Tat' and 'ALL C' respectively. In this framework, both the heterogeneity of the players' roles and the multiplicity of time-scales are crucial for cooperation, which are quite natural settings from the view point of control theory. Besides, the boundary for cooperation also turns out to depend on the relative payoffs of the players.
Language英语
Funding Project[National Natural Science Foundation of China]
Document Type期刊论文
Identifierhttp://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/46452
Collection系统科学研究所
国家数学与交叉科学中心
Affiliation中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
Mu Yifen,Guo Lei. howcooperationarisesfromrationalplayers[J]. sciencechinainformationscience,2013,56(11).
APA Mu Yifen,&Guo Lei.(2013).howcooperationarisesfromrationalplayers.sciencechinainformationscience,56(11).
MLA Mu Yifen,et al."howcooperationarisesfromrationalplayers".sciencechinainformationscience 56.11(2013).
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