KMS Of Academy of mathematics and systems sciences, CAS
Controllability of Nash Equilibrium in Game-Based Control Systems | |
Zhang, Ren-Ren; Guo, Lei | |
2019-10-01 | |
发表期刊 | IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL |
ISSN | 0018-9286 |
卷号 | 64期号:10页码:4180-4187 |
摘要 | Controlling complex systems to desired states is of primary importance in science and engineering. In the classical control framework, the plants to be controlled usually do not have their own payoff or objective functions; however, this is not the case in many practical situations in, for examples, social, economic, and "intelligent" engineering systems. This motivates our introduction of the game-based control system (GBCS), which has a hierarchical decision-making structure: one regulator and multiple agents. The regulator is regarded as the global controller that makes decision first, and then, the agents try to optimize their respective objective functions to reach a possible Nash equilibrium as a result of noncooperative dynamic game. A fundamental issue in the GBCS is: Is it possible for the regulator to change the macrostates by regulating the Nash equilibrium formed by the agents at the lower level? This leads to the investigation of controllability of the Nash equilibrium of the GBCS. In this paper, we will first formulate this new problem in a general nonlinear framework and then focus on linear systems. Some explicit necessary and sufficient algebraic conditions on the controllability of the Nash equilibrium are given for a linear GBCS, by solving the controllability problem of the associated forward and backward dynamic equations, which is a key technical issue and has rarely been explored in the literature. |
关键词 | Controllability hierarchical structure maximum principle Nash equilibrium noncooperative differential games |
DOI | 10.1109/TAC.2019.2893150 |
语种 | 英语 |
资助项目 | National Natural Science Foundation of China[11688101] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[91634203] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61227902] |
WOS研究方向 | Automation & Control Systems ; Engineering |
WOS类目 | Automation & Control Systems ; Engineering, Electrical & Electronic |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000490772500017 |
出版者 | IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/35821 |
专题 | 国家数学与交叉科学中心 |
通讯作者 | Guo, Lei |
作者单位 | Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Inst Syst Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zhang, Ren-Ren,Guo, Lei. Controllability of Nash Equilibrium in Game-Based Control Systems[J]. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL,2019,64(10):4180-4187. |
APA | Zhang, Ren-Ren,&Guo, Lei.(2019).Controllability of Nash Equilibrium in Game-Based Control Systems.IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL,64(10),4180-4187. |
MLA | Zhang, Ren-Ren,et al."Controllability of Nash Equilibrium in Game-Based Control Systems".IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL 64.10(2019):4180-4187. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
个性服务 |
推荐该条目 |
保存到收藏夹 |
查看访问统计 |
导出为Endnote文件 |
谷歌学术 |
谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
[Zhang, Ren-Ren]的文章 |
[Guo, Lei]的文章 |
百度学术 |
百度学术中相似的文章 |
[Zhang, Ren-Ren]的文章 |
[Guo, Lei]的文章 |
必应学术 |
必应学术中相似的文章 |
[Zhang, Ren-Ren]的文章 |
[Guo, Lei]的文章 |
相关权益政策 |
暂无数据 |
收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。
修改评论