Distributed best response dynamics for Nash equilibrium seeking in potential games

CSpace

	Distributed best response dynamics for Nash equilibrium seeking in potential games
	Huang Shijie 1; Yi Peng 2
	2020-01-01
发表期刊	Control Theory and Technology
ISSN	2095-6983
卷号	18 期号:3 页码:324-332
摘要	In this paper, we consider distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in potential games over a multi-agent network, where each agent can not observe the actions of all its rivals. Based on the best response dynamics, we design a distributed NE seeking algorithm by incorporating the non-smooth finite-time average tracking dynamics, where each agent only needs to know its own action and exchange information with its neighbours through a communication graph. We give a sufficient condition for the Lipschitz continuity of the best response mapping for potential games, and then prove the convergence of the proposed algorithm based on the Lyapunov theory. Numerical simulations are given to verify the result and illustrate the effectiveness of the algorithm.
关键词	Distributed algorithms Nash equilibrium seeking best response dynamics non-smooth finite-time tracking dynamics potential games
收录类别	CSCD
语种	英语
CSCD记录号	CSCD:6803398
引用统计
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/57713
专题	中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院
作者单位	1.中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院 2.同济大学
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Huang Shijie,Yi Peng. Distributed best response dynamics for Nash equilibrium seeking in potential games[J]. Control Theory and Technology,2020,18(3):324-332.
APA	Huang Shijie,&Yi Peng.(2020).Distributed best response dynamics for Nash equilibrium seeking in potential games.Control Theory and Technology,18(3),324-332.
MLA	Huang Shijie,et al."Distributed best response dynamics for Nash equilibrium seeking in potential games".Control Theory and Technology 18.3(2020):324-332.