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How Group Cohesion Promotes the Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Game Under Conditional Dissociation
Qu Xinglong1; Cao Zhingang2; Yang Xiaoguang3,4; The Anh Han5
2019-06-30
Source PublicationJASSS-THE JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL SIMULATION
ISSN1460-7425
Volume22Issue:3Pages:19
AbstractLeaving is usually an option for individuals if they cannot tolerate their defective partners. In a two-player game, when a player chooses to leave, both she and her opponent become single players. However, in a multi-player game, the same decision may have different consequences depending on whether group cohesion exists. Players who choose not to leave would still be united together rather than be separated into singletons if there is cohesion among them. Considering this difference, we study two leaving mechanisms in public goods games. In the first mechanism, every player would be single once any of the group members leaves. In the second, we assume group cohesion exists that members who don't leave form a union. In our model, each player adopts a trigger strategy characterized by a threshold: she leaves if the number of defectors in her group exceeds the threshold. We find that under both mechanisms, when the expected lifespan of individuals is long enough, cooperators with zero tolerance toward defection succeed in the evolution. Moreover, when cohesion exists in groups, cooperation is better promoted because the cooperators have a higher chance to play together. That is, group cohesion facilitates positive assortment and therefore promotes cooperation.
KeywordGroup Cohesion Public Goods Game Cooperation Emergence Conditional Dissociation Positive Assortment
DOI10.18564/jasss.4070
Language英语
Funding ProjectNational Natural Science Foundation of China[71701058] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71871009] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71532013] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71850008] ; Future of Life Institute[RFP2-154]
WOS Research AreaSocial Sciences - Other Topics
WOS SubjectSocial Sciences, Interdisciplinary
WOS IDWOS:000475374400005
PublisherJ A S S S
Citation statistics
Document Type期刊论文
Identifierhttp://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/35118
Collection系统科学研究所
Corresponding AuthorCao Zhingang
Affiliation1.Hangzhou Dianzi Univ, Res Ctr Informat Technol & Social & Econ Dev, Hangzhou 310018, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
2.Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Dept Econ, 3 Shangyuancun Haidian Dist, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China
3.Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, 55 Zhong Guan Cun Donglu, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
4.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, 19 A Yuquan Rd, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China
5.Teesside Univ, Sch Comp Media & Arts, Middlesbrough TS1 3BX, England
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
Qu Xinglong,Cao Zhingang,Yang Xiaoguang,et al. How Group Cohesion Promotes the Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Game Under Conditional Dissociation[J]. JASSS-THE JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL SIMULATION,2019,22(3):19.
APA Qu Xinglong,Cao Zhingang,Yang Xiaoguang,&The Anh Han.(2019).How Group Cohesion Promotes the Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Game Under Conditional Dissociation.JASSS-THE JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL SIMULATION,22(3),19.
MLA Qu Xinglong,et al."How Group Cohesion Promotes the Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Game Under Conditional Dissociation".JASSS-THE JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL SIMULATION 22.3(2019):19.
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