CSpace
The Effect of Unannounced Inspection on Prevention of Drug Fraud
Zhang, Manman1; Zhang, Juliang1; Cheng, T. C. E.2; Hua, Guowei1; Yan, Xiaojie3; Liu, Yi1
2019-02-01
Source PublicationJOURNAL OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
ISSN1004-3756
Volume28Issue:1Pages:63-90
AbstractAlarge number of incidents related to fake/inferior-quality drugs have occurred in China in recent years. In order to reduce drug crimes, the China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) has exploited the new supervision approach, i.e., unannounced inspection (UI), since September 2014. However, the effectiveness of UI in driving drug producers to put more effort into meeting the requirements of Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) is yet to be ascertained. In this paper we apply game theory to study the effects of UI on the prevention of drug fraud, drug producers' profits, and social welfare under scenarios of complete and incomplete information. We show that UI is not always an effective way of supervision. Specifically, if the upper bound on the punishment is not very large, UI can drive the firmto make the largest self-supervision effort only when the firm's technical level is high and the supervision cost is low. Otherwise, UI cannot drive the firm to make the largest self-supervision effort. Under incomplete information, firms with a high technical level would adopt more self-supervision and make more profit than those with a low technical level. Moreover, we design a new mechanism under incomplete information that can incentive drug producers to make greater self-supervision effort to meet the requirements of GMP under certain conditions.
KeywordDrug supervision healthcare system game theory Nash equilibrium incomplete information mechanism design
DOI10.1007/s11518-018-5382-8
Language英语
Funding ProjectNational Natural Science Foundation of China[71390334] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71132008] ; Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University[NCET-13-0660]
WOS Research AreaOperations Research & Management Science
WOS SubjectOperations Research & Management Science
WOS IDWOS:000458257400003
PublisherSPRINGER HEIDELBERG
Citation statistics
Document Type期刊论文
Identifierhttp://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/32366
Collection中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院
Affiliation1.Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China
2.Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Dept Logist & Maritime Studies, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
3.Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
Zhang, Manman,Zhang, Juliang,Cheng, T. C. E.,et al. The Effect of Unannounced Inspection on Prevention of Drug Fraud[J]. JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING,2019,28(1):63-90.
APA Zhang, Manman,Zhang, Juliang,Cheng, T. C. E.,Hua, Guowei,Yan, Xiaojie,&Liu, Yi.(2019).The Effect of Unannounced Inspection on Prevention of Drug Fraud.JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING,28(1),63-90.
MLA Zhang, Manman,et al."The Effect of Unannounced Inspection on Prevention of Drug Fraud".JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 28.1(2019):63-90.
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Related Services
Recommend this item
Bookmark
Usage statistics
Export to Endnote
Google Scholar
Similar articles in Google Scholar
[Zhang, Manman]'s Articles
[Zhang, Juliang]'s Articles
[Cheng, T. C. E.]'s Articles
Baidu academic
Similar articles in Baidu academic
[Zhang, Manman]'s Articles
[Zhang, Juliang]'s Articles
[Cheng, T. C. E.]'s Articles
Bing Scholar
Similar articles in Bing Scholar
[Zhang, Manman]'s Articles
[Zhang, Juliang]'s Articles
[Cheng, T. C. E.]'s Articles
Terms of Use
No data!
Social Bookmark/Share
All comments (0)
No comment.
 

Items in the repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.