The impact of public information on insider trading

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	The impact of public information on insider trading
	Luo, SL
	2001
发表期刊	ECONOMICS LETTERS
ISSN	0165-1765
卷号	70 期号:1 页码:59-68
摘要	We study the impact of public information on insider trading in the context of Kyle's speculative market. The linear Nash equilibrium is characterized analytically. We find that public information is detrimental for the insider and beneficial for the liquidity traders. The insider puts a negative weight on the public information in formulating his optimal strategy. The equilibrium price becomes more informative when there exists public information. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; D43; D82.
关键词	insider trading public information private information Nash equilibrium
语种	英语
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
WOS类目	Economics
WOS记录号	WOS:000165772500008
出版者	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
引用统计
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/16780
专题	应用数学研究所
通讯作者	Luo, SL
作者单位	Acad Sinica, Inst Appl Math, Beijing 100080, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Luo, SL. The impact of public information on insider trading[J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS,2001,70(1):59-68.
APA	Luo, SL.(2001).The impact of public information on insider trading.ECONOMICS LETTERS,70(1),59-68.
MLA	Luo, SL."The impact of public information on insider trading".ECONOMICS LETTERS 70.1(2001):59-68.