Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents

doi:10.1287/opre.2021.2105

CSpace > 应用数学研究所

	Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents
	Cao, Zhigang 1; Chen, Bo 2; Chen, Xujin3,4 ; Wang, Changjun3,5
	2021-07-20
发表期刊	OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN	0030-364X
页码	17
摘要	We propose a game model for selfish routing of atomic agents, who compete for use of a network to travel from their origins to a common destination as quickly as possible. We follow a frequently used rule that the latency an agent experiences on each edge is a constant transit time plus a variable waiting time in a queue. A key feature that differentiates our model from related ones is an edge-based tie-breaking rule for prioritizing agents in queueing when they reach an edge at the same time. We study both nonadaptive agents (each choosing a one-off origin-destination path simultaneously at the very beginning) and adaptive ones (each making an online decision at every nonterminal vertex they reach as to which next edge to take). On the one hand, we constructively prove that a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) always exists for nonadaptive agents and show that every NE is weakly Pareto optimal and globally first-in first-out. We present efficient algorithms for finding an NE and best responses of nonadaptive agents. On the other hand, we are among the first to consider adaptive atomic agents, for which we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) always exists and that each NE outcome for nonadaptive agents is an SPE outcome for adaptive agents but not vice versa.
关键词	selfish atomic routing deterministic queuing adaptive routing subgame perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium
DOI	10.1287/opre.2021.2105
收录类别	SCI
语种	英语
资助项目	Ministry of Science and Technology of China[2018AAA0101002] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[11601022] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[11971046] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71922003] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71871009] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71961137005] ; Young Elite Scientists Sponsorship Program by CAST[2018QNRC001] ; Chinese Academy of Sciences[XDA27010102] ; Chinese Academy of Sciences[ZDBS-LY-7008]
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics ; Operations Research & Management Science
WOS类目	Management ; Operations Research & Management Science
WOS记录号	WOS:000708983500001
出版者	INFORMS
引用统计
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/59429
专题	应用数学研究所
通讯作者	Wang, Changjun
作者单位	1.Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China 2.Univ Warwick, Warwick Business Sch, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England 3.Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China 4.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Math Sci, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China 5.Beijing Univ Technol, Coll Math, Fac Sci, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Cao, Zhigang,Chen, Bo,Chen, Xujin,et al. Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents[J]. OPERATIONS RESEARCH,2021:17.
APA	Cao, Zhigang,Chen, Bo,Chen, Xujin,&Wang, Changjun.(2021).Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents.OPERATIONS RESEARCH,17.
MLA	Cao, Zhigang,et al."Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents".OPERATIONS RESEARCH (2021):17.