Blockchain competition: The tradeoff between platform stability and efficiency

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2021.05.031

CSpace

	Blockchain competition: The tradeoff between platform stability and efficiency
	Jiang, Shangrong 1; Li, Yuze 2,3; Wang, Shouyang 1,2; Zhao, Lin 2
	2022-02-01
发表期刊	EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
ISSN	0377-2217
卷号	296 期号:3 页码:1084-1097
摘要	Since 2017, the Bitcoin blockchain system has experienced 105 fork divergences. The rapidly increasing blockchain forks have resulted in fierce competition and created significant controversies in blockchain community. To analyze this competitive aspect, we consider blockchain as a two-sided platform that serves both customers and miners. We develop a game-theoretic model to investigate how a blockchain platform's decision on its settings, such as block size and transaction fee, affects the competition between blockchain platforms as well as the participation behavior of customers and miners. Our findings suggest that increasing the transaction fee alleviates congestion on the platform when customers have a relatively balanced need between efficiency and safety. In contrast, it induces congestion when efficiency is valued over safety. In addition, under hard fork competition, the difference in blockchain platforms' block sizes directs the attention of miners towards different types of mining rewards. Moreover, it also affects the optimal types of customers the blockchain platforms should target. Furthermore, we find that the degree of congestion and the risk attitudes of participants play vital roles in differentiating different block-sized platforms' optimal transaction fees. We provide empirical evidence on the theoretical findings and practical implications for blockchain platform competition with respect to the behaviors of platform participants. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
关键词	Game theory Blockchain Platform competition Empirical analysis
DOI	10.1016/j.ejor.2021.05.031
收录类别	SCI
语种	英语
资助项目	National Natural Science Foundation of China[71988101]
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics ; Operations Research & Management Science
WOS类目	Management ; Operations Research & Management Science
WOS记录号	WOS:000705404300023
出版者	ELSEVIER
引用统计
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/59390
专题	中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院
通讯作者	Wang, Shouyang
作者单位	1.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China 2.Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Zhongguancun East Rd 55, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China 3.Boston Univ, Questrom Sch Business, Boston, MA 02215 USA
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Jiang, Shangrong,Li, Yuze,Wang, Shouyang,et al. Blockchain competition: The tradeoff between platform stability and efficiency[J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH,2022,296(3):1084-1097.
APA	Jiang, Shangrong,Li, Yuze,Wang, Shouyang,&Zhao, Lin.(2022).Blockchain competition: The tradeoff between platform stability and efficiency.EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH,296(3),1084-1097.
MLA	Jiang, Shangrong,et al."Blockchain competition: The tradeoff between platform stability and efficiency".EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH 296.3(2022):1084-1097.