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Tight efficiency lower bounds for strategy-proof mechanisms in two-opposite-facility location game
Chen, Xujin1,2; Hu, Xiaodong1,2; Tang, Zhongzheng3; Wang, Chenhao4
2021-06-01
Source PublicationINFORMATION PROCESSING LETTERS
ISSN0020-0190
Volume168Pages:6
AbstractWe study the two-opposite-facility location game on a line segment, where a mechanism determines the locations of a popular facility and an obnoxious facility for finitely many agents. The agents report their private locations, and try to maximize their own utilities depending on their distances to the facilities. We prove tight bounds on the inapproximability of both randomized and deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms for maximizing the total agent utility minus a penalty determined by the distance between the two facilities. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
KeywordFacility location game (Universally) strategy-proof mechanism Approximation algorithms Inapproximability
DOI10.1016/j.ipl.2021.106098
Indexed BySCI
Language英语
Funding ProjectMOST of China[2018AAA0101002] ; NNSF of China[11531014] ; Chinese Academy of Sciences[XDA27010102] ; Chinese Academy of Sciences[ZDBS-LY-7008]
WOS Research AreaComputer Science
WOS SubjectComputer Science, Information Systems
WOS IDWOS:000624438100006
PublisherELSEVIER
Citation statistics
Document Type期刊论文
Identifierhttp://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/58318
Collection应用数学研究所
Corresponding AuthorWang, Chenhao
Affiliation1.Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Beijing, Peoples R China
2.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Math Sci, Beijing, Peoples R China
3.Beijing Univ Posts & Telecommun, Sch Sci, Beijing, Peoples R China
4.Univ Nebraska, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Lincoln, NE 68588 USA
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
Chen, Xujin,Hu, Xiaodong,Tang, Zhongzheng,et al. Tight efficiency lower bounds for strategy-proof mechanisms in two-opposite-facility location game[J]. INFORMATION PROCESSING LETTERS,2021,168:6.
APA Chen, Xujin,Hu, Xiaodong,Tang, Zhongzheng,&Wang, Chenhao.(2021).Tight efficiency lower bounds for strategy-proof mechanisms in two-opposite-facility location game.INFORMATION PROCESSING LETTERS,168,6.
MLA Chen, Xujin,et al."Tight efficiency lower bounds for strategy-proof mechanisms in two-opposite-facility location game".INFORMATION PROCESSING LETTERS 168(2021):6.
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