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The efficiency of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler
Chen, Xujin1,2; Hu, Xiaodong1,2; Wang, Chenhao1,2,3; Wu, Xiaoying1,2
2020-10-24
发表期刊THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE
ISSN0304-3975
卷号838页码:180-194
摘要We study the efficiency of Nash equilibria for the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler. In the game, we are given a set of facilities and a set of players along with a scheduler, where each facility is associated with a linear cost function, and the players are randomly ordered by the scheduler. Each player chooses exactly one of these facilities to fulfill his task, which incurs to him a cost depending on not only the cost function of the facility he chooses and the players who choose the same facility (as in a usual load balancing game), but also his uncertain position in the uniform random ordering. From an individual perspective, each player tries to choose a facility for optimizing his own objective that is determined by a certain decision-making principle. From a system perspective, it is desirable to minimize the maximum cost among all players, which is a commonly used criterion for load balancing. We estimate the price of anarchy and price of stability for this class of load balancing games under uncertainty, provided all players follow one of the four decision-making principles, namely the bottom-out, win-or-go-home, minimum-expected-cost, and minimax-regret principles. Our results show that the efficiency loss of Nash equilibria in these decentralized environments heavily rely on player's attitude toward the uncertainty. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
关键词Load balancing game Price of anarchy Price of stability Decision-making principle Nash equilibrium
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2020.07.024
收录类别SCI
语种英语
资助项目MOST of China[2018AAA0101002] ; NNSF of China[11531014] ; CAS[ZDBS-LY7008]
WOS研究方向Computer Science
WOS类目Computer Science, Theory & Methods
WOS记录号WOS:000566368800014
出版者ELSEVIER
引用统计
文献类型期刊论文
条目标识符http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/52082
专题应用数学研究所
通讯作者Wu, Xiaoying
作者单位1.Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
2.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Math Sci, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China
3.City Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
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Chen, Xujin,Hu, Xiaodong,Wang, Chenhao,et al. The efficiency of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler[J]. THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE,2020,838:180-194.
APA Chen, Xujin,Hu, Xiaodong,Wang, Chenhao,&Wu, Xiaoying.(2020).The efficiency of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler.THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE,838,180-194.
MLA Chen, Xujin,et al."The efficiency of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler".THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE 838(2020):180-194.
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