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Platform Competition in Peer-to-Peer Lending Considering Risk Control Ability
Liu, He1,2; Qiao, Han1; Wang, Shouyang1,2; Li, Yuze1
2019-04-01
发表期刊EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
ISSN0377-2217
卷号274期号:1页码:280-290
摘要As a new e-commerce phenomenon in financing, peer to peer (P2P) lending has received increased attention recently. For P2P lending platforms, risk control ability (i.e., the ability to accurately assess and screen borrowers to control the credit risk of loans) is a competitive differentiator. The paper models a three-stage game to investigate optimal risk control ability and corresponding optimal prices of P2P lending platforms under different tariffs and agents' homing choices. Risk-price coefficients for lenders and borrowers are introduced to measure the impact of risk control ability on prices, where higher risk-price coefficients indicate that prices are more sensitive to risk control ability. Moreover, the paper investigates the role of platforms' scales in deciding optimal risk control ability, prices and market shares. To our best knowledge, this is the first theoretical paper to study the competition in P2P lending considering risk control ability based on game theory. The analytical results show that: 1) In equilibrium, optimal risk control ability decreases in risk-price coefficients; 2) The risk-price coefficient for lenders contributes less than that for borrowers to optimal risk control ability if some lenders multi-home; 3) Smaller platforms have higher risk control ability, prices and attract more borrowers than larger platforms under specific conditions. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
关键词E-commerce Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending Risk control ability Two-sided markets game theory
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2018.09.024
语种英语
资助项目General Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China[71872171] ; General Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China[71373262] ; Major Research Plan of National Natural Science Foundation of China[71390330] ; Major Research Plan of National Natural Science Foundation of China[71390331]
WOS研究方向Business & Economics ; Operations Research & Management Science
WOS类目Management ; Operations Research & Management Science
WOS记录号WOS:000456904600020
出版者ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
引用统计
文献类型期刊论文
条目标识符http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/32267
专题系统科学研究所
通讯作者Qiao, Han
作者单位1.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Econ & Management, 80 Zhongguancun East Rd, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
2.Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, 55 Zhongguancun East Rd, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Liu, He,Qiao, Han,Wang, Shouyang,et al. Platform Competition in Peer-to-Peer Lending Considering Risk Control Ability[J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH,2019,274(1):280-290.
APA Liu, He,Qiao, Han,Wang, Shouyang,&Li, Yuze.(2019).Platform Competition in Peer-to-Peer Lending Considering Risk Control Ability.EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH,274(1),280-290.
MLA Liu, He,et al."Platform Competition in Peer-to-Peer Lending Considering Risk Control Ability".EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH 274.1(2019):280-290.
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